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Abstract 
Several studies found ancillary benefits of the provision of public goods to be of 
considerable size. If these additional private benefits were noticed, they would imply 
not only higher cooperative but also non-cooperative provision levels. However, 
beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there would be 
qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: public policy 
would no longer be a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate 
these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation in the context of 
climate change. In particular, we address the following question. Would ancillary 
benefits if they were taken in consideration increase participation in international 
climate agreements and raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? 
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1. Introduction 
Already Musgrave (1959: 13) stressed: “Certain public wants may fall on the border 
line between private and social wants, where the exclusion principle can be applied to 
part of the benefits gained but not to all.” Such impure public goods raised much 
attention in economics. For instance, Andreoni (1989, 1998) applies the basic 
approach developed by Cornes and Sandler (1984) to the field of philanthropy and 
shows that neutrality of income redistribution (the neutrality theorem by Warr (1982, 
1983)) does not hold in the case of impure public goods. Cornes and Sandler (1994) 
demonstrate that divergent degrees of substitutability/complementarity of the private and 
public characteristics of the impure public good lead to quite different comparative static 
results. 
Recently, the inefficiently low provision of impure public goods at an international 
level receives much attention in the literature. Comparative static analyses based on 
the model by Cornes and Sandler (1994) are conducted by Rübbelke (2003) who 
investigates climate policy as well as by Kotchen (2005) who considers 
environmentally friendly consumption where the public good characteristic is tropical 
biodiversity. Rübbelke (2003) includes an alternative technology producing the 
impure public good’s private characteristic independently of the public one,1 while 
Kotchen (2005) allows for both, an independent production of the private as well as of 
the public characteristic.2 Sandler and Murdoch (1990) study another international 
policy issue. They consider a system of demand equations for pure and impure public 
good problems and distinguish between Nash-Cournot and Lindahl behavior. They 
1	 Löschel and Rübbelke (2009) conduct a related numerical analysis based on climate 
policy in Germany. 
2 Vicary (1997, 2000) investigates different technologies available for raising the level of 
the public characteristic of the impure public good. 
1 
illustrate their technique by estimating military expenditure equations for a sample of 
ten NATO allies. They find that Nash-Cournot, rather than Lindahl behavior, best 
characterizes allies’ behavior. More importantly, they find that the impure public 
good specification provides a better fit than the pure public good specification for 
their model.  
Although the analysis of the impact of private characteristics on the non-cooperative 
and optimal policy levels is important, the analysis of the strategic implications for the 
prospects of cooperation is still in its infancy. Such implications may affect the 
willingness of countries to participate in agreements that coordinate internationally 
the provision of impure public goods.   
Also in the climate change context it has been argued that combating global warming 
generates not only global public benefits by slowing climate change (primary 
benefits), but also ancillary benefits which are enjoyed privately by the individual 
climate protecting nations.3 Whereas the primary benefits of climate policy can be 
enjoyed globally, the ancillary benefits can only be enjoyed on a local or regional 
scale (IPCC (1996: 217)).4 Aunan et al. (2007: 472) point to significant ancillary 
benefits to China since climate protection efforts will not only cause a reduction in 
GHG emissions but also reductions in emissions of local/regional pollutants like 
particles and NOX-emissions. These (and other) non-GHG-emission reductions – in 
turn – will improve public health and will increase agricultural yields on a 
3 Ancillary benefits are benefits generated by climate policy that are not derived from the 
slowing of climate change. Other terms which convey this idea are secondary benefits, co­
benefits and spillover benefits (see IPCC (2001) and Markandya and Rübbelke (2004: 
489)). 
4 Furthermore, in contrast to primary benefits, ancillary benefits arise almost immediately 
after the climate protection measure has been accomplished. Krupnick, Burtraw and 
Markandya (2000: 55) note: “we feel the heart of the analysis of ancillary benefits 
involves the here and now that is relevant to individual policy makers in a national 
context.” 
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local/regional scale. Similar results illustrating the significance of ancillary benefits in 
developing countries emerge from studies by, e.g., Rive and Rübbelke (2010) for 
China, Dessus and O’Connor (2003) for Chile and Bussolo and O’Connor (2001) for 
India.5 
Although considered to be of less importance than in developing countries, ancillary 
benefits in industrialized countries may also be significant. Several studies found that 
ancillary benefits may exceed the primary benefits from slowing climate change, as 
Pearce (2000: 523) illustrates. For the US he shows that ancillary benefits are a 
multiple of primary benefits, in the range between 0.07 and 6.67 (for European studies 
the range is between 0.98 (UK) and 6.93 (Germany)). An overview of further US 
studies is provided by Burtraw et al. (2003: 650-673). 
As Ekins (1996a: 163, 1996b: 14) illustrates the inclusion of ancillary benefits in cost-
benefit analyses will cause a rise in optimal climate policy levels. Moreover, Cornes 
and Sandler (1984: 595) stress for impure public goods that “the jointly produced 
private output can serve a privatizing role, not unlike the establishment of property 
rights”. Nevertheless, also for such goods, one should expect sub-optimally low 
provision levels because of the (remaining) public good part which evokes free-riding 
incentives. 
In other words, were ancillary benefits being noticed by governments, this would call 
for higher globally optimal abatement levels but this would also be the case in the 
non-cooperative equilibrium. Because of the gap between optimal and non­
cooperative climate protection levels, international coordination would still be 
Ancillary benefits of environmental protection in the form of reputational benefits 
enjoyed by clubs of firms are discussed by van’t Veld and Kotchen (2012). Green 
electricity as an impure public benefit to private households is investigated by Kotchen 
and Moore (2007). 
3 
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needed. However, the lack of a global coercive authority prevents the enforcement of 
an efficient level of global climate protection; countries have to voluntarily negotiate 
and agree upon such coordination, i.e. they have to form self-enforcing agreements. It 
is this strategic dimension of ancillary benefits that we are interested in but which has 
been neglected so far in the literature on impure public good provision, including the 
application to climate protection. In particular, we address the following question. 
Would ancillary benefits if they were taken in consideration increase participation in 
international climate agreements and would this raise the success of these treaties in 
welfare terms? Our research is immediately related to two approaches. The first 
approach analyzes for instance the implications of mitigation versus adaptation (e.g. 
Barrett (2008)) or the link of climate mitigation and R&D of new abatement 
technologies (e.g. Barrett (2006), Hoel and de Zeeuw (2009)) for the success of self-
enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs). However, their settings 
imply two strategies and two effects whereas our analysis implies that one strategy 
(i.e. abatement) has two effects (i.e. a private and a public effect).  
The second approach proposed by Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) analyzes the strategic 
implications of ancillary benefits as we do but restricts attention to only two countries 
and a simple bi-matrix game. They find that if international negotiations are 
represented as a chicken game, ancillary benefits tend to have a positive influence on 
the propensity of countries to participate in an international agreement on climate 
change. 
In this paper, we will investigate the second approach further. We depart from the 
normal form game in Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) and use a non-cooperative coalition 
formation game (as the first approach mentioned above does) which has been 
pioneered by Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1992) and 
4 
subsequently being continued for instance by Breton et al. (2006), Caparrós et al. 
(2004), de Zeeuw and Pavlova (2011), Finus et al. (2005) and Osmani and Tol 
(2009).6 We investigate three model versions, which have been considered in the 
literature. We reach quite different and mostly negative conclusions compared to 
Pittel and Rübbelke (2008). The driving forces are different in the three models. In the 
first model, ancillary benefits lead to a smaller coalition as they reduce the threshold 
of countries necessary for an agreement to be profitable. In the other two models, 
ancillary benefits increase not only abatement and payoffs of coalition members but 
also of outsiders, which leaves the free-rider incentives mainly unchanged.  
In the following, we develop our framework, analyze the size of stable coalitions and 
evaluate the success of coalition formation in welfare terms for three models in 
Section 2. Finally, we summarize our main findings in Section 3 and point to possible 
future research issues. 
2. The Model 
2.1 Introduction 
We consider a two-stage cartel formation game with N  countries – which can be 
regarded as the working horse in the analysis of international environmental agree­
ments since Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1992). In the 
first stage, countries decide upon membership. Countries that join the coalition are 
called signatories (with superscript M  for members) and those that remain outside 
are called non-signatories (with superscript NM  for non-members) and assumed to 
act as singletons. Let n  denote the number of signatories with N  the total number of 
A survey of this large body of literature is provided for instance in Carraro (2000) and 
Finus (2003, 2008). Many applications to international environmental problems are 
provided in Barrett (2003) and with particular reference to climate change in Endres 
(2011). 
5 
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countries, n N . In the second stage, signatories coordinate their actions, choosing 
their abatement levels such as to maximize the aggregate payoff to all signatories.7 
Non-signatories act selfishly and maximize only their own payoff. The payoff 
function of an individual country is given by 
N 
(1)  i  B q j  B i       0 ( q )  C q  i with 
 j 1  
 
N N 
where the public good part of benefits, B(q )  , depends on total abatement, q ,j j 
j 1 j 1 
the private good part of benefits, B( q ) , as well as abatement cost, C( q ) , dependi i 
on individual abatement, qi .
8 The parameter   measures the weight which ancillary 
benefits receive in the payoff function of countries. Thus,   0 corresponds to the 
standard assumption in the literature on IEAs. For simplicity and mathematical 
convenience, we assume the same functional form for primary benefits and ancillary 
benefits. For a similar reason, we assume countries to be ex-ante symmetric, i.e. all 
have the same payoff function, though depending on whether they are signatories or 
non-signatories they may receive different payoffs ex-post.9 These simplifications 
allow us to concentrate on the general effects of ancillary benefits on the strategic 
interaction of signing cooperative agreements.  
Upon reflection of the objective function in (1) it is worthwhile noting that ancillary 
benefits cannot only be viewed as an “additional factor” on the benefit side, but, 
7 Alternative assumptions such as modest abatement targets, which may lead to larger 
stable coalitions have been considered by Finus and Maus (2008). A similar idea, 
including a negotiation process between different countries has already been proposed by 
Endres (1997) and later applied to the coalition context by Finus and Rundshagen (1998). 
8 As we assume a static payoff function, endogenous technological change cannot be 
captured by our model. Moreover, links between primary and ancillary benefit are 
assumed away. 
9 This assumption has been made frequently in the literature though it is certainly a 
simplification. See for instance Yi (1997). 
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alternatively, as a “reducing factor” on the cost side since both costs and ancillary 
benefits are ‘private’ to the abating agent (see also Ekins 1996b: 14).10 In the 
following, our analysis proceeds along the first interpretation, though the alternative 
interpretation leads to qualitatively equivalent results. 
Given the equilibrium abatement choices in the second stage (which we analyze in 
more detail in the subsequent subsections), a signatory’s payoff is denoted by  iM ( n )  
and a non-signatory payoff by  iNM ( n )  in order to indicate that payoffs will depend 
on the number of signatories, n . Working back to the first stage, a coalition is said to 
be stable if it is internally and externally stable:11 
(2) Internal Stability:  iM ( n )   iNM  ( n   1)   i S 
(3) External Stability:  iNM ( n )    iM ( n   1)   i S 
where S  denotes the set of coalition members and where we assume for convenience 
that in case a non-signatory is indifferent between joining and staying outside the 
coalition he will join. In some parts of the analysis it will be helpful to work with the 
stability function introduced by Hoel and Schneider (1997) 
 i ( n )   iM ( n )   iNM  ( n 1)  noticing that  i ( n )  0  means internal stability and 
 i ( n  1)   0  external stability. In other words, if coalition n  is internally stable, then 
coalition n 1  is externally unstable and if coalition n  is externally stable, then 
coalition n 1 is internally unstable.  
10 We owe this point to Catherine Hagem. 
11 Alternative stability concepts, which lead to larger stable coalitions, like for instance 
farsighted stability, have been considered for instance by Osmani and Tol (2009). 
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Subsequently, we consider specific benefit and cost functions that have been 
frequently used in the literature as analytical results for general payoff functions 
cannot be derived. 
2.2 Model with Linear Benefit and Cost Functions 
The simplest payoff function assumes linear benefit and cost functions, which may 
almost be regarded as a toy model, though it has received a lot of prominence in the 
recent literature (e.g. Barrett (2003), Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007)). The reason – 
apart from its simplicity – is that this model version allows generating every stable 
coalition size which can be related to the benefit-cost ratio from abatement.  
Consider the following payoff function where b is a benefit and c  a cost parameter: 
N 
(4)  i  b q  b i  qi with b 0 , c 0 and   j q c   0 . 
j 1 
Since only the relation b / c  matters, we let   b / c and rewrite (4): 
N 
(4)#  #   q   q q  with  i  j i  i 0 
j 1 
such that  i #  is the payoff per cost unit, some kind of normalized payoff. In this 
simple model, we can normalize the strategy space q [0,1]  such that there are i
essentially only two possible equilibrium strategies: “abate” ( q 1 ) or “not abate”i 
( q 0 ) . In order to make this model interesting for the subsequent analysis, we  
follow the standard assumption in the literature and assume that the social optimum 
and the Nash equilibrium differ. A sufficient condition for abatement q 1  to be an i
equilibrium choice in the social optimum is 
8 
i
Nj 1 #j 1(5) Assumption 1:  N        1 0   qi N  
whereas in the Nash equilibrium no abatement qi  0  is an equilibrium choice 
provided 
(6) Assumption 2: 
 
q
i
i
# 
  1 0   
1 
1 
        
holds. Summarizing inequality (5) and (6), this prisoners’ dilemma type of incentive 
structure requires the following range of parameters: 
(7) Assumption 1+2: 1 /(1        )  1 /( N   ) . 
That is, abatement pays from a global but not from an individual perspective.12 Then 
total payoffs in the social optimum are  S #   N( N   1) and in the Nash  
equilibrium  N #   0 . 
Suppose now that a coalition of n  signatories forms. Non-signatories, act as 
singletons, and hence their equilibrium abatement choice is qi
NM  0 . For signatories 
abatement pays, i.e. qi
M  1 , provided  iM #( n )  n  1 0      holds which is 
equivalent to n  1  . Suppose this condition holds. In order to test for internal 
stability, we have to compute the payoff of a signatory that leaves the coalition with 
n  signatories such that n 1 signatories are left. 
In the social optimum, the unit cost of abatement is smaller than the global benefits which 
it generates (inequality (5)) whereas in the Nash equilibrium the unit cost is larger than 
the individual benefits (inequality (6)). With respect to inequality (6) this means that we 
assume ancillary benefits to be not so large to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma. 
9 
12 
Consider first the possibility that the n 1  signatories continue to abate because 
 iM #          1( n 1) ( n  1)     0  (though the free-riders will not abate as this is the 
equilibrium choice for singletons) which is equivalent to n 1  1  . Then the  
free-rider receives a payoff of  iNM # ( n   1)  ( n  1)   . Compared to  iM #( n ) , the 
free-rider receives   units of benefits less from global abatement, receives no 
ancillary benefits but also faces no abatement costs as he chooses now qi
NM  0 
instead of qi
M  1 . Internal stability requires  iM # ( n )  n  1      
    which we ruled out by Assumption 2 in (6).  ( n  1)   iNM # ( n 1)  or   1 1 
Consider now the second possibility that signatories switch from abatement to no 
abatement once a signatory leaves as abatement is no longer profitable for n 1 
signatories because  iM #          1   1  . Then( n 1) ( n  1)     0 or n 1  
 iNM #   iM #        ( n 1)  0  and internal stability requires  ( n )  n  1 
NM # 10  i ( n  1)   which is equivalent to n   . This condition holds by our initial
assumption made above, namely that abatement is profitable for the coalition in the 
first place. Hence, it is the second possibility that defines an internally stable 
coalition. Letting n n* , then internal stability requires 
* 1 * 1(8) n   and n   1  . 
In other words, n*  is the largest integer of the relation 1 /   , i.e. n*  I(1 /    ) . 
For any n n* , signatories would continue to abate after one signatory has left their 
coalition, which cannot be an equilibrium as argued above. For any n n*  signatories 
10 
would not abate in the first place (as abatement is not profitable) and hence no coali­
tion would form. It is easily checked that n*  is also the only coalition which is exter­
nally stable and hence stable. 
Thus, in this model, the driving force is a strong threshold effect with n n* the
break-even point of profitability. The lower the benefit-cost ratio   b / c  , the more 
countries are required to make a coalition profitable (i.e. larger threshold) and hence 
the larger will be the size of the stable coalition, n* . Most importantly, because 
ancillary benefit increase the benefits (or reduce abatement costs), the threshold will 
be smaller the larger   and hence the smaller will be the coalition size n* . 
Consequently, in this model, ancillary benefits reduce the equilibrium size of the 
stable coalition or at best leave it unchanged (depending on the exact value of   as n * 
is an integer value). 
Total payoff in the coalition equilibrium is given by 
C  * M *  * NM  *  C#  *  n  i ( n )  ( N   n )  i ( n )  and hence   n ( N     1)  in this 
model. In order to evaluate the success of coalition formation in welfare terms, it 
seems sensible to use a relative welfare measure. This is to avoid measuring a welfare 
effect which is only due to an additional term in the payoff function whenever   0 . 
Hence, we use the “closing the gap index”, which is one possible relative measure as 
suggested by Eyckmans and Finus (2006):13 
 C #   N #  (9) CGI :  S #  N #    
13 For an application of this index in the context of regional fisheries management and a more 
extensive discussion, see Pintassilgo et al. (2010). 
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with 1 CGI   0 . Substituting n*  I(1 /    ) into  C# , and using  S #  and  N # 
as computed above, we find: 
* 
(10) CGI  n . 
N 
Thus, anything else being equal, the closing the gap index decreases with the number 
of players involved in the externality problem, N . This result reflects the public good 
nature of global environmental problems and is well-known from other models. 
Moreover, noting that n*  I(1 /    ) , CGI  (weakly) decreases in  . Thus, the 
negative impact of   on the relative welfare measure is due to the negative impact on 
the coalition size. Hence, ancillary benefits do not improve but may only have a 
negative impact on our relative performance measure. As we will see, this negative 
conclusion will not change much in the subsequent models. 
Despite being skeptical about absolute welfare measures, we would like to mention 
for completeness that in absolute terms the conclusion is less negative because  
 (11) 
C#( )  2 N  2  
which could be positive if N ,   and/or   are sufficiently small.14 
2.3 Model with Linear Benefit and Quadratic Cost Functions 
Consider the following payoff function which has been considered for instance in 
Botteon and Carraro (1997), Barrett (2006) and Finus and Maus (2008), though 
without the ancillary benefit part: 
14 * *For the derivation, we approximate n  I(1 /    ) by n  1 /   . 
12 
N 
(12)  i  bq j bq  i  c qi2 with b 0   and   0 . , c 0
j 1  2 
Also for this model only the relation b / c  matters, and hence we let   b / c  and 
rewrite (12): 
N 1(12)#    q   qi#   j qi i2 with   0 . 

j 1  2
 
The first order conditions of signatories read n    iM  0 and for non-signatories  q 
  qiNM  0 , assuming an interior solution and denoting abatement of signatories    
with superscript M  (members) and abatement of non-signatories with superscript 
NM  (non-members). Hence, q ( n )  ( n   ) and (1   ) and totaliM    qiNM    
C  M  NM  2abatement is given by Q  ( n )  i  n )q  i  N   n ) . If one nq  ( n )  ( N    ( n     N 
M NMmember leaves the coalition, q ( n 1)  ( n 1   ) , qi (1   )           andi
C 2Q ( n  1)   ( n     N    3n )     N 2 . Substitution of these abatement levels into the 
payoff function gives 
 iM # 1 2 2 2n  2( n )   ( n   2N   2N        ) ,2 
(13)  iNM # ( n )  1  2( 2n 2  2N  2N 2n  2 1 )      ,2 
 iNM # ( n  1)  1  2( 2n  2  2N   2N   6n  3  2      ) .2 
Computation of the stability function  i ( n )   iM #( n )   iNM #  ( n 1)  shows that 
 i  i   irrespective of  and hence( n )  0 for n { 2,3 }  and  ( n 1)   0 for n 3
n*  3 . Thus, in this model, ancillary benefits have no impact on the size of the stable 
coalition. The intuition (which can be confirmed by observing (13)) is that in this 
13 
model ancillary benefits increase payoffs of signatories,  iM #( n ) , by exactly the same 
amount as the payoffs of non-signatories if one member has left the coalition, 
 iNM # ( n 1)  , and hence the incentive to leave or join the coalition remains 
unchanged. In other words, the drop in benefits (benefits from global abatement and 
ancillary benefits) and the drop in abatement costs when leaving a coalition become 
larger with increasing  , but by the same factor. 
We can now compute the global payoff in the coalition equilibrium 
C #  * M #  *  *  NM #  *  *  n  i      i ( n )  by using n  3 and find:( n )  ( N  n )  
 C #   1  2( 11N  2N 2  2N 2  N 2  24 ) . Moreover, the global payoff in the
2 
social optimum is N  iM #( n )  , substituting N  for n  in  iM #( n ) . Similarly, the global 
payoff in the Nash equilibrium is N  iNM # ( n )   in  iNM # ( n ) . We find for, setting n 1
the closing the gap index: 
(14) CGI  12( N  2 ) 2N( N 1) 
which is positive but smaller than 1  if N 3  because then the grand coalition is not 
stable ( n*  N ). Again, it is straightforward to show that    0 providedCGI / N 
N 3 . Hence, as in the first model (Section 2.2), the coalition improves upon the 
non-cooperative outcome but achieves only little if the number of countries which 
suffer from the externality is large. Most importantly, in this model ancillary benefits 
have no impact on the relative measure of the success of coalition formation. Roughly 
speaking, all payoffs just change by some factor related to  and, as just argued 
above, the coalition size does not change for the same reason. Hence, not only 
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stability but also the relative performance in welfare terms is unaffected by ancillary 
benefits. 
Of course, if we measured success in absolute terms, conclusions would be brighter: 
as the equilibrium coalition size does not change through ancillary benefits, 
equilibrium abatement increases for signatories and non-signatories in  , ancillary 
benefits receive a positive weight in countries’ payoff function and payoff functions 
are strictly concave in abatement,  C#   0 holds. However, this positive 
absolute effect is almost implied by the nature of ancillary benefits and has been 
pointed out in the Introduction in terms of the Nash equilibrium and the social 
optimum. This positive effect could only be upset in the context of coalition formation 
if the equilibrium coalition size were smaller with ancillary benefits as this was the 
case in the first model. 
Compared to the previous model we may conclude that ancillary benefits have at least 
not a negative effect on the coalition size and the relative welfare measure, but it also 
cannot be called a breakthrough. 
2.4 Model with Quadratic Benefit and Quadratic Cost Functions 
Consider the following payoff function: 
 N 1  N 2   1 2  c 2(15)   b a  q   q b aq  q  q with b 0 i   j  j    i i  i , c 0 and j 1 2   2  2  j 1     
  0 . 
This payoff function is essentially the same as in Barrett (1994), Diamantoudi and 
Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) though they assume   0 .15 Since this 
Different from Barrett (1994), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph 
(2006) we do not assume Stackelberg leadership of signatories to be consistent with the 
15 
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model is far messier in terms of derivations than the previous models, we sketch here 
only the main arguments of the analysis and relegate the details to the appendix. 
The first thing to notice is that marginal benefits from global abatement are positive if 
and only if total abatement is smaller than a  and marginal benefits from ancillary 
benefits are positive if and only if individual abatement is smaller than a . Hence, in 
order to ensure interior solutions, it suffices to ensure that total abatement in the social 
optimum is smaller than a  for which a sufficient condition is: 
(16) Assumption 3: 
( N 
1
1)    with   b / c  . 
as argued in the Appendix. In a next step, we analyze the stability function, which we 
write  i ( n,   )   iM # ( n,   ) iNM #  ( n  1,   ) with   being a set of parameters, 
comprising  ,   b / c  and N . It turns out that stability does not depend on the 
benefit parameter a  (see (15)). Not surprisingly for N 2 ,  i ( 2,   )  0 , i.e. the 
grand coalition is stable. In order to analyze the more interesting case of N 3 , we 
first show that  i ( n,   ) /  N   0 (and 2 i ( n,   ) /  N  2    0 ). That is, with an 
increasing number of coalition members, it becomes more difficult to establish 
stability for a given number of signatories, n . Hence, in order to test whether 
 i  can be positive for n 2 , we substitute N 3  and n 3  into the stability ( n,   )   
function and find  i ( 3,   )  0 . Hence, we can conclude that there cannot be a stable 
coalition larger than 2. This finding probably goes back to Carraro and Siniscalco 
previous models where Stackelberg leadership would make no difference due to dominant 
strategies. See Finus (2003). Note that Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and 
Ulph (2006) specify their model in terms of emissions which requires to observe 
constraints as to ensure non-negative emissions. An easy way to get around this problem 
in our setting is to assume that initial emissions are sufficiently large such that abatement 
can never exceed initial emissions. It easy to check that equilibrium abatement will never 
be negative in our model. 
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(1991).16 The new and interesting part is that this also holds for ancillary benefits for 
any  defined in the range in (16). 
In a next step, we set   0  and n 2  in the stability function but make no further 
assumptions, i.e.  i ( n  2,    . We establish that for 0   ( N )   1 0,  ,N )     
 i ( n  2,     0 0,  ,N )  where  ( N )  is an upper bound which decreases in N , 
 ( N ) / N  0    . That is, with an increasing number of players N , the range of the 
parameter   for which internal stability can be guaranteed for two signatories 
decreases. 
Now we let   0  in the stability function,  i ( n  2,  , ,N )      , and show that 
 i ( n  2,  , ,N )    if          0 ( ,N )  where ( ,N )   is defined in equation (A14) in 
the appendix. Since  is bounded from above as spelled out in (16), we get: 
(17) 1    ( ,N )  with   b / c      
( N 1)  
such that ancillary benefits can make a difference. For    ( N )  it can be shown that 
there exists an  satisfying this inequality. However, the upper bound of  in (17), 
1 /(( N  1)  )  , decreases in  and N  and the lower bound of  ( ,N )  , increases   ,   
in  and N . Thus, for a given N , we can only slightly increase  above  ( N )   such 
that   can still satisfy condition (17). With increasing N  this possibility diminishes 
further. 
For instance, recall that we denote the upper bound of  without ancillary benefits by 
 ( N )  . Define  ( N ,  )        i      0  such that for 0  ( N ,  )  ( n  2,  , ,N )  and 
16 Note that for the Stackelberg assumption, larger stable coalitions could form. See Barrett 
(1994), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006). 
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notice that  ( N ,   ) increases in  . Denoting the upper bound of  ( N ,   )  with 
ancillary benefits by   ( N )   by inserting the highest possible value of  in  ( N ,   ) 
which is the left-hand term in (17), we have   ( N )    ( N )  and find for instance for 
N 3 :   ( 3 )  0.59  but only  ( 3 )   0.41  without ancillary benefits. However, 
already for N 7 :   (7 )  0.08 , which is only slightly above  (7 )  0.07 without 
ancillary benefits. Thus, the possible extension of the parameter range of   for which 
a coalition of two players is stable with ancillary benefits tends to zero for a 
sufficiently large number of players.  
Even more interesting is that one can show that for N 4  the closing the gap index 
CGI , our relative welfare measure as defined in (9), decreases in  for 
0   ( N )   1 . This is the parameter range for which a two player coalition would    
be stable even without ancillary benefits. Thus, it is only for  ( N )       ( N ,  )  
where no coalition would be stable without ancillary benefits and hence CGI  0 
where ancillary benefits can make a difference as CGI  0 . However, as pointed out 
above, with increasing N  the difference between  ( N ,   ) and  ( N )  shrinks and is 
almost zero already for N 10 17 . 
Taken together, for this model the effect of ancillary benefits is mixed but also not 
very encouraging. First of all, ancillary benefits cannot expand the coalition to more 
than 2 signatories which is the upper limit without ancillary benefits. Second, for the 
parameter range of the benefit-cost parameter   for which a coalition of two signato­
ries is stable without ancillary benefits, an increasing weight   of ancillary benefits 
17 Again, like in the second model, and not surprisingly, if we measured performance in 
absolute terms, then ancillary benefits would increase equilibrium abatement and global 
welfare in the coalition equilibrium for the same reasons mentioned in Section 2.3. 
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has a negative impact on the relative performance measured as the closing the gap 
index. Third, in a few instances, ancillary benefits can expand the range of the 
benefit-cost parameter for which a two player coalition is stable. This expansion is 
negligible if the total number of players is sufficiently large.  
3. Summary and Conclusions 
Ancillary benefits have attracted much attention in climate change research and are 
regularly found to be of significant size. The IPCC (2007: 623) stresses the impor­
tance of ancillary benefits in the design of air pollution and energy security policies 
and the rise in rural employment. The “efficiency-raising impact” of an inclusion of 
ancillary benefits in cost-benefit analyses has been highlighted recurrently. Efficient 
climate protection levels would rise considerably if ancillary benefits were included.  
Whereas this prediction is straightforward, it is less clear how the privatizing effect of 
ancillary benefits, if noticed and considered by actors, would affect the strategic 
interplay between actors and in particular the prospects of cooperation. Intuitively, 
one would expect that taking ancillary benefits into account will alleviate free-riding 
incentives and hence will raise the attractiveness of participation in international 
agreements to slow climate change. However, this intuition was not confirmed in our 
strategic setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. We found that ancillary 
benefits have a neutral or negative impact on the size of stable coalitions and the 
relative success of coalition formation measured in welfare terms. Only in the model 
with quadratic benefit and quadratic cost functions could ancillary benefits expand the 
range of the benefit-cost parameter for which a two player coalition can be stable, 
though this occurs only in a few instances. However, even then the expansion 
appeared to be small if the total number of players is sufficiently large.  
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The conclusion which can be drawn from these results is that although ancillary 
benefits provide additional incentives to protect the climate, they will not raise the 
likelihood of an efficient global agreement on climate change to come about. The 
rationale behind this result is that countries taking the private ancillary benefits to a 
greater extent into account will undertake more emission reduction, irrespective of an 
international agreement. The relative importance of an international agreement for 
climate protection is reduced since the privatizing effect of ancillary benefits already 
provides incentives for protection in a non-cooperative setting. Hence, though 
ancillary benefits provide an additional incentive to participate and to raise abatement 
contributions, they also provide an additional incentive to leave the agreement.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, ancillary benefits are not only important in the 
environmental context but in many other instances in economics. Hence, many public 
goods are in fact impure public goods. Consequently, though our model made explicit 
reference to climate change, the qualitative conclusions carry over to other problems 
as long as the provision of impure public goods is voluntary (i.e. is not provided by 
the government and/or not enforced by a central authority) and features not only 
public benefits but also some private benefits (Cornes and Sandler (1996)).  
Scope for future research is offered by exploring the influence of technological 
progress on the provision level of impure public good models. Dynamic settings 
might be especially helpful in this context.18 For instance, Corradini et al. (2011) recently 
modelled R&D-investment decisions and emissions abatement in a dynamic theoretical 
framework in which the knowledge stock is considered to be an impure public good. 
18	 Bahn and Leach (2008) consider ancillary effects of climate policy due to the reduction of 
SO2 emissions in an overlapping generation model. 
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Appendix 
For payoff function (15) in the text, the first order condition of a non-signatory and 
signatory (assuming an interior solution), respectively, are given by  
b Q NM M    QNM   QNM (A1) ab   Q  ab b N n   c     0    N n  
(A2) n ab     NM QM   ab  b QM   c QM   0b Q     n   n  
where we denote total abatement of non-signatories by QNM  and of signatories by 
QM  with the understanding that total abatement is QNM QM  ( N   n  )q  iNM  nq  iM . 
Solving (A1) and (A2) simultaneously delivers: 
(A3) QM  abn( nc bn N  bn
2 bN  2   b c ) 
b  c )( b  bn2  bN    c ) ( bn

NM ab( N  n )(  2b b bn 2  n b    c )
       c(A4) Q  2(b  c )( b  bn  bN    c ) bn 
Computing qi
NM QNM /( N   n )  and qiM QM / n  we find 
(A5) qM  qNM   ab( n 1)( c b( N 1)) .i i 2(b  c )( b  bn  bN   c ) bn 
It is easy to show that Assumption 3 in (16) is sufficient that A5 is positive, all 
individual and global equilibrium abatement levels are positive and smaller than the 
parameter a  such that marginal benefits from global abatement and marginal 
ancillary benefits from individual abatement are always positive. Moreover, global 
abatement increases with the coalition size, n . 
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In a next step we analyze the stability function  i ( n )  iM ( n )   iNM  ( n 1)  . We find 
1 2 2 2 (A6)  i ( n,   )   iM ( n )   iNM  ( n  1)   ( n 1)(  bN      b ) ( b a  ) D  withE F G   
   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2D       ( 3 4b n 2bN 6bn  2b Nn 4b n N 3b n  2b n N  2b n  b n  
3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 5 2 3 2 4 26 b  2n b 2n b N  b N  2nbN  nb N  2bn b n 7b n  5b n   8bn  
2 2 2 2 2  2  28b n  3 b  2 b N    4 b )   6 b n  
E 2(  b bn  2 3bn   2b  bN  1)  2 ,  b  bn  2  bN  bn  1)  2 F (  , G ( b 1)  
where E , F  and G  are positive and hence the denominator is positive. The first 
three terms in the numerator are also positive. Hence, the sign of  i ( n,   ) depends 
on the sign of D . We observe that D  does not depend on the parameter a  and only 
depends on the relation   b / c  . Hence, the sign of D  is a function of the parameters 
2 ,  , N  and n . Dividing D  by c , letting D#  D 2 and using   b / c  , we findc
(A7)       2( n   N  n3   Nn  n  2 n  2 1) D#/  N   0 
because the term in brackets is positive, noticing that n 1 . Moreover, 
(A8) 2D#/  N 2    2 (   n )      0 . 
Substituting N 2  and n 2  into D#  gives 
(A9) D#( 2,2 )    4  4     2 1   2 2 2   0 . 
Substituting N 3  and n 3  into D#  gives 
(A10) D#( 3,3 )        1)  8  ( 9    0 
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and hence we can conclude that for N 3  there is no stable coalition of more than 2 
signatories. Consequently, it remains to analyze stability for n 2  .  and N 3
Substituting n 2  but making no assumptions about N gives  into D#
(A11) D#( 2   , )  A B with 
 2 N 4 3 2 2   2 2  A 1  (  8 2N ) ( 4   N )  and B  ( 8 2N ) 2      . 
We observe that A and B  decrease in N and for given  and   become negative 
for N sufficiently large. Moreover, B  0 if   0 . Solving D#( 2  for , ) , setting 
  0 , gives 
 2    N  N  24 N 2 3 3    N N  4 N 2 3 3 (A12)  1  2 and  2  2N 4 3N 4  3N 4 N 4 
As it can be shown, only the first solution is positive for N 3  and hence the relevant 
one, which we denote by  ( N )  in the text. Since A is concave in   , wefor N 3
can conclude that  i ( 2, ) 0   if 0     ( N ) . It is straightforward to check that 
( N ) 1   and  ( N )    for N 3  / N  0  . 
Investigating B and computing       B /  2  2( 8 2    reveals that  has N 2 )  
clearly a positive influence on stability for N { 3 4 . For N 5  must be suffi­ , }  , 
ciently large. Noticing that B , and hence A B  if  , is convex in   is sufficiently 
large, we solve D#( 2, )  and find for 
 1 N 4  2     2 N  3 N 3  2  2   2   
(A13) 1   and 
27 
1  N  4  2  2 N 2  3 2 N  3 2 2   
where only the first solution is positive and hence the relevant one. Hence, observing 
Assumption 3 in (16) in the text, we get 
1  N    2  2 N 2  3 2 N  3 21    4  (A14)   ( ,N )  .      
( N 1)    
Obviously, 1 /(( N  1)  )  decreases in N  and  ( ,N )  we find  . For  
 ( ,N )   2( 3 3N   N 2  2 N     ( ,N )   1 3 (A15)  N  2( 3 3N   N 2  0 and    2  0 
recalling that we assume N 3 . Hence, with increasing N , the range of  that satis­
fies (A14) decreases. Moreover, the possibility of increasing   above  ( N )  to 
 ( N ,   )  is also limited. For instance, using (A12) and (A14), assuming for  the 
highest possible value,    , letting  ( N ,   1 / (( N  1)  ))   1 / (( N 1)  )     ( N )  
we find: 
N 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
( N )   0.41 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 
( N )   0.59 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 
Inserting  ( N )  for   in (A14) shows however that 1  ( ,N )   0 for
( N 1)  
N 2  and hence there always exists an   that satisfies condition (A14) at the limit 
of    ( n ) . 
Investigating the closing the gap index as defined in (9) in the text for n 2 , we find 
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(A16) CGI  2(  N
2
2 
 1) H 
2 withN(  2  N  1) (   1)( N 1) 
H  3 2 2    2 N   2 N 2   2 N   N 6  2 2 N  2 N 2   2  2 N   2N   3  2 2 2 4  2 N   
Differentiating CGI  with respect to   gives 
CGI 2 2( N  2 )(    N  1) J with J I , (A17)    3 2 2    K N(   2  N  1) (    1) ( N  1) 
2 2 2 3 2I  ( 2N   N 6 )   2  ( N    N )   ( N   N )  and 
2 2 2 2 2 2K   ( 4N  2N  12 )   ( 2N  N 6 )  2 ( N  N ) . 
We want to show that J 0  and hence that this derivative is negative. First we 
concentrate on I . We notice that I  is concave in  . Setting I  0  and solving for  
gives two values of which only one is positive. This value, denoted by  ( N ) , is 
given by 
N 1 2N  2  9N   5 3     2N  (A18)  ( N )   .N( N  1) 
Thus, I  0  if    ( N )  . Now it can be shown that  ( N )    ( N )  for N 4  and
hence I  0   ( N )  for N 4  and 0    , i.e. the parameter range for which a coali­
tion of two players is stable without ancillary benefits. We now turn to K  and find: 
(A19) K   ( 4N  2  2N  12 )   2  2( 2N  2  N 6 )   2 2( N  2  N )  and 

2K  2 2
2  2 ( 2N   N 6 )  .  
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The second derivative is positive for N 3 K  is convex in   and hence . 
Consequently, setting the first derivative to zero and solving for  gives us a 
minimum. We find: 
2( N 2    N ) 1 ( 4N 2  2N 12 ) 
(A20) *  
2( 2N 
 
2  N 6 ) . 
Now the numerator can only be positive if 1 /   is sufficiently small. Since we 
   1 
for  ( N )   . Consequently, K  is 
consider the range 0   ( N )   , we test whether the numerator of *  is positive 
. It turns out that this is not the case for N 3
minimized for   0 . Then, however,  , and hence J 0K 0   and therefore 
CGI /  0   ( N )  . Consequently, we can conclude that  can only   for 0    
have a positive influence on CGI  if and only if    ( N )  because then no coalition 
is stable without ancillary benefits. 
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